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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment allows for a President to
voluntarily transfer the power of his office to the Vice President during periods of presidential inability.1 Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
allows for the Vice President and a majority of the cabinet to involuntarily
remove the President if he is incapable or unwilling to acknowledge that he
is unable to discharge the powers of his office.2 With the recent election of
President Donald J. Trump, there have been increased discussions about the
protections of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and how they could be used to
check President Trump in the event that he becomes mentally unstable or
otherwise becomes unable to manage the affairs of the executive branch.3
However, many of these discussions neglect to examine the inherent weaknesses of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.4 Conversely, other commentators
acknowledge the inherent weaknesses of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment but
propose unrealistic or dangerous modifications to the existing legal framework.5
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
3. Ross Douthat, The 25th Amendment Solution for Removing Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(May 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/opinion/25th-amendment-trump.html;
Richard A. Friedman, Is It Time to Call Trump Mentally Ill?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/opinion/is-it-time-to-call-trump-mentally-ill.html;
Heather Digby Parton, Don’t Look Now: It’s President Pence! Donald Trump Can Be Deposed, Even Without Impeachment, SALON (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.salon.com/
2017/01/25/dont-look-now-its-president-pence-donald-trump-can-be-deposed-even-withoutimpeachment/; Dean Falvy, You’re Fired: Four Ways Donald Trump’s Presidency Might Not
Last Four Years, JUSTIA (Feb. 2, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/02/02/youre-firedfour-ways-donald-trumps-presidency-might-not-last-four-years.
4. For example, consider the following scenario: it is early September of 2020 and
President Donald J. Trump, along with Vice President Mike Pence and the rest of the Cabinet, are in the midst of a scorched earth presidential campaign to win a second term in the
White House. Further, during this tight reelection campaign and daily global turmoil, President Trump complains of numbness in his right arm and blurry vision during a private meeting with Vice President Pence, Secretary Ben Carson, and Ivanka Trump. Mr. Pence and Dr.
Carson soon begin noticing that the President is having frequent difficulty expressing himself
verbally, recalling recent events, and staying focused on simple tasks. They also begin noticing that Ivanka Trump is limiting their access to the President and is performing most of his
official duties on his behalf. Vice President Pence and the rest of the cabinet now have a
decision to make: do they reveal the underlying medical condition of the President and exercise the involuntary protections of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment against President Trump, or
do they remain silent? Exercising the involuntary provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
would almost certainly cause the President to lose his reelection bid. However, if President
Trump continues to serve, he may put the country at grave risk due to his illness.
5. See, e.g., Earl Blumenauer, The Fatal Flaw of the 25th Amendment, OREGONIAN
(Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2017/02/the_fatal_flaw_of_the
_25th_ame.html.
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This article will therefore examine the shortcomings of the TwentyFifth Amendment and how to improve this amendment responsibly within
the existing legal framework. Part II of this article will detail the legal
framework of presidential disability law prior to the adoption of the TwentyFifth Amendment, the eventual passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
and the actual legal framework of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.6 Part III
will critique the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and discuss possible solutions to
modify and strengthen the Twenty-Fifth Amendment within the existing
legal framework.7 This section will also consider and reject various proposals to replace the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Part IV will offer various
ways to strengthen the protections of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment within
the existing constitutional framework.8 Part V will conclude that, although
there is room for improvement, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment still offers the
best way to prevent presidential disability.9
II. BACKGROUND
Although the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has recently come into vogue,
the history of presidential inability and the legal frameworks seeking to
remedy its effects is as old as the presidency itself.10 Part A will discuss the
legal framework prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Part
B will discuss the passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Part C will examine the legal framework of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
A.

The Prior Legal Framework

The legal framework managing presidential inability prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment consisted of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution,
various order of succession laws, and, to a lesser extent, the Twentieth
Amendment. However, as discussed below, the Constitution was ambiguous
about key provisions, and the order of succession has changed multiple
times to reflect different policy goals.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
Charles Witt, The Health and Controversial Death of George Washington, 80 EAR,
NOSE AND THROAT J. 102, 104 (2001) (detailing the medical issues plaguing President George
Washington).
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Article II, Section 1, Clause 6

The Founding Fathers originally provided for the possible death or incapacity of the President of the United States in Article II, Section 1 of the
Constitution.11 This provision states that:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress
may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer
shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until
the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.12

a.

Presidential inability

During the Constitutional Convention, Delaware delegate John Dickinson asked “what is the extent of the term ‘disability’ and who is to be the
judge of it?”13 Unfortunately, Dickinson’s question would never be answered during the Convention or in the Constitution.14 Thus, it should come
as no surprise that this clause has been subject to much debate concerning
(1) what is inability and (2) who determines when inability exists.15 Nonetheless, the prevailing historical view of most presidential administrations
and academics was that the Vice President determines the inability of the
President.16
b.

Death of a President: The Tyler precedent

Another ambiguity in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 is whether the vice
president, upon the death, incapacity, resignation, or impeachment of the
President, assumes the presidency or merely serves as the acting President
until the next election.17 The text of the provision only states that “[i]n Case
of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation,
or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same
11. U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 1, cl. 6.
12. Id.; see also Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr., Presidential Disability, 307 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. 144, 144–46 (1956).
13. JAMES M. RONAN, LIVING DANGEROUSLY: THE UNCERTAINTIES OF PRESIDENTIAL
DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 1 (2015).
14. See id. at 1–3.
15. Id. at 1.
16. See John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 912–13 (2010).
17. Id. at 918–19.
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shall devolve on the Vice President.”18 However, any ambiguity was essentially put to rest by the decisive actions of Vice President John Tyler.19
President William Henry Harrison, the ninth President of the United
States, died of pneumonia on the early morning of April 4, 1841.20 Harrison
was the first President to die in office, so the matter was not settled on
whether the Vice President ascended to the presidency or merely served as
acting President.21 Nonetheless, Vice President Tyler believed that Article II,
Section I, combined with his taking of the presidential oath, entitled him to
fully assume the presidency in his own right.22 Tyler acted out his belief by
asserting his authority as President over the cabinet and his detractors.23
Congress later passed a resolution recognizing John Tyler as the tenth President of the United States.24 This resolution, coupled with Tyler’s strong actions, set precedent for the Vice President assuming the presidency following the death, resignation, or impeachment of the President rather than merely serving as acting President.25
c.

Death of the President and Vice President: Order of succession laws

Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 also provides for Congress to establish
who, in the event that both the President and Vice President are impeached,
resigned, or deceased, will serve as acting President.26 The acting President,
however, will only serve until “the Disability be removed” or until a new
President is elected.27 Fortunately, throughout the history of the United
States, the succession laws have not been put to the test.28

18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
19. Leonard Dinnerstein, The Accession of John Tyler to the Presidency, 70 VA. MAG.
HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 448, 449 (1962).
20. JOHN R. BUMGARNER, THE HEALTH OF THE PRESIDENTS: THE 41 UNITED STATES
PRESIDENTS THROUGH 1993 FROM A PHYSICIAN’S POINT OF VIEW 59, 62 (1994); see also
EDWARD P. CRAPOL, JOHN TYLER: THE ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENT 7–10 (2006).
21. CRAPOL, supra note 20, at 7–10.
22. RONAN, supra note 13, at 12–13; Dinnerstein, supra note 19, at 449.
23. See RONAN, supra note 13, at 12–15.
24. Id. at 15.
25. Id.; see also Joel K. Goldstein, History and Constitutional Interpretation: Some
Lessons from the Vice Presidency, 69 ARK. L. REV. 647, 689 (2016) (“Public servants often
invoke prior practice to justify behavior. Seven Vice Presidents who succeeded to the presidency in the nineteenth and twentieth century relied on the Tyler Precedent to justify their
claims. In fact, the practice quickly won such acceptance that no citation was needed.”).
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
27. Id.
28. RONAN, supra note 13, at 7–9, 23–25, 34–35.
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The first order of succession law was The Presidential Succession Act
of 1792.29 This law provided that, should both the Office of the President
and Vice President be vacant due to death, resignation, or removal from
office, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate would serve as Acting President of the United States.30 If the office of the Senate Pro Tempore of the
Senate were vacant, the Speaker of the House of Representatives would
serve as Acting President of the United States.31 The law also required that a
special election be held to elect a new President.32
The second order of succession law was the Presidential Succession
Act of 1886.33 This law removed both the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House from the order of succession and replaced them with members of the cabinet.34 The order of succession within
the cabinet was based on seniority of when the cabinet department was created.35 This law did not require a special election to elect a new President.36
The modern law is the Presidential Succession Act of 1947.37 This law,
assuming the President and Vice President are deceased, resigned, or impeached, makes the Speaker of the House the first in the order of succession.38 The President Pro Tempore of the Senate is next in the line of succession, followed by members of the cabinet based on seniority of when their
departments were established.39 Although this law has never been used, its
constitutionality has been questioned.40
2.

The Twentieth Amendment

The Twentieth Amendment, which was ratified in 1933, moved the beginning of the presidential term from March 4th to January 20th.41 The
Amendment also provided that if the President-Elect dies in-between election day and inauguration day, the Vice President-Elect is to be sworn in as

29. Id. at 7.
30. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 10.
33. RONAN, supra note 13, at 23.
34. Charles S. Hamlin, The Presidential Succession Act of 1886, 18 HARV. L. REV. 182,
182–83 (1905).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006); see RONAN, supra note 13, at 34.
38. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1).
39. Id. § 19(b), (d).
40. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession
Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 113–16 (1995).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
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President.42 The Amendment also provides for additional guidelines to be
written by Congress if necessary.43
B.

The Passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment

Although there had been attempts at reform in the past following various periods of presidential inability, the periods of inability suffered by
President Eisenhower and President Johnson and the death of President
Kennedy would serve as the necessary catalyst for the passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.44 On September 24, 1955, President Dwight E. Eisenhower suffered a heart attack during the middle of the night during a trip in
Denver, Colorado.45 Although the condition was originally downplayed by
the administration, Eisenhower insisted that the public be made fully aware
of his medical condition.46 Eisenhower was expected to fully recover from
his heart attack but required complete rest for a month.47 During this rest, the
Cabinet carried out the status quo of government.48 Moreover, Governor
Sherman Adams of Colorado would serve as the official spokesman of the
President rather than Vice President Nixon.49 During this time, the executive
branch was dysfunctional, and it was often unclear whether a bedridden
President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, or Governor Adams was in
charge of the federal government.50
Another shortcoming of the current legal system was highlighted on
June 8, 1956 when President Eisenhower was taken to the hospital for the
removal of an obstruction in his small intestine.51 While in surgery, which
lasted two hours, the President was unconscious.52 It was unclear during
those two hours who, if anyone, would have legal authority to act if an
emergency arose during that time.53

42. Id. § 3; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing
the Constitution’s Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215, 216 (1995).
43. See RONAN, supra note 13, at 31–32.
44. Id. at 71–72; see Herbert Brownell, Jr., Presidential Disability: The Need for a Constitutional Amendment, 68 Yale L. J. 189, 210–211 (1958); see also Ruth C. Silva, Presidential Succession and Disability, 21 L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 646, 660–62 (1956).
45. JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
213–14 (1965).
46. Id. at 214–16.
47. Id. at 215.
48. JOHN D. FEERICK THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
APPLICATIONS 19 (3rd ed. 2014).
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id.
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Because of Eisenhower’s health conditions and the continued legal uncertainty as to who is President during times of incapacity, Eisenhower began speaking with Vice President Nixon, the cabinet, and the Department of
Justice to study the problem of presidential disability and succession.54 The
Attorney General could not reach a conclusion on what procedure should be
followed if the President were unable to declare his own incapacity.55 Eisenhower wanted the law changed so that a President could declare his own
incapacity or, in the event that the President could not declare his own incapacity, a panel of medical experts and the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court could make that determination.56 Several cabinet members, however,
preferred that the Vice President make the determination of presidential incapacity, with checks and balances provided by the cabinet.57 This latter idea
was proposed by the Eisenhower administration to Congress as a constitutional amendment.58 However, the amendment failed for partisan reasons
because Democrats feared this was a way to install Nixon as President prior
to the election.59
Since the constitutional amendment failed, Eisenhower and Nixon entered into an informal agreement to manage presidential incapacity.60 The
agreement provided that the Vice President would serve as acting President
if the President stated that he was incapacitated or would be incapacitated.61
In the event that the President could not declare his incapacity, the Vice
President would make that determination after appropriate consultation.62
However, in either event, the President could determine at any time when
his incapacity had ended and would then resume the full powers of his office.63
This agreement represented the first significant step towards addressing
the problem of presidential incapacity.64 However, this agreement was purely voluntary and did not have the force of law. Moreover, a President who is
clearly incapacitated from a legal standpoint may still retain the physical
ability to declare that his incapacity has ended. Fortunately, despite Eisenhower’s medical conditions, the agreement was never put to the test and
Eisenhower continued his administration without further incident.65 Future
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

FEERICK, supra note 48, at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24.
FREERICK, supra note 48, at 53.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 54.
Id.
See id.
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administrations would borrow the agreement that Eisenhower and Nixon
established.66
On November 22, 1963 at approximately 12:30 p.m., President Kennedy was assassinated as his motorcade drove through Dallas, Texas.67 President Kennedy was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead at 1:00
p.m.68 Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson took the oath of office at 2:38 p.m.
and assumed the presidency.69
The line of presidential succession was especially vulnerable during
this dangerous time in American history.70 When Lyndon Johnson assumed
the presidency at age 55, he already had known, serious medical issues, including heart complications.71 Additionally, Speaker of the House John
McCormack was 71 years old and Senate Pro Tempore Carl Hayden was 86
years old.72 Finally, at this time in history, there was no way for the President to name a replacement Vice President.73
Despite his relatively poor health, President Johnson had only minor
periods of incapacity in the White House.74 In October of 1965, President
Johnson had his gall bladder removed.75 Before going under anesthesia,
President Johnson voluntarily transferred the powers of the presidency to
Vice President Hubert Humphrey under the terms of their informal agreement, making Humphrey the acting President.76 After recovering from the
effects of the anesthesia, President Johnson resumed the powers of the presidency pursuant to their agreement.77 Although the legality of this transfer
could be questioned, as a matter of policy it was a wise decision and helped
pave the way for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.78
66. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 54.
67. JOSIAH THOMPSON, SIX SECONDS IN DALLAS: A MICRO-STUDY OF THE KENNEDY
ASSASSINATION 196–213 (1967).
68. November 22, 1963: Death of the President, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIB.
AND MUSEUM, https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/November-22-1963-Death-ofthe-President.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
69. Id; see also Julia L. Ernst, John F. Kennedy and Constitutional Aspects of Presidential Succession, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 63, 64 (2004).
70. See Ernst, supra note 69, at 64.
71. How JFK’s Assassination Led to a Constitutional Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR.
(Nov. 22, 2016), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2016/11/how-jfks-assassination-led-to-aconstitutional-amendment/.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. James M. Young, M.D., Presidential Illness and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: A
Former White House Physician’s Perspective, in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL
DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 74–75 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.

10

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

On January 6, 1965, in response to the death of President Kennedy and
this recent history of presidential inability, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana
proposed S. J. Res. 1 in the Senate.79 An identical resolution was introduced
in the House by Congressman Emanuel Celler, who was the Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee.80 The Senate passed Senator Bayh’s resolution
on February 19, 1965 and the House passed an amended version of S. J.
Res. 1 on April 22, 1965.81 The differences between the House and Senate
versions were relatively minor.82 A Conference Committee was appointed to
resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of the
amendment.83 The final version of the proposal, which would later become
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, was approved by the House on June 30, 1965
and then by the Senate on July 6, 1965.84 This proposal was ratified by the
necessary number of state legislatures on February 10, 1967, thereby becoming the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.85
C.

The Legal Framework of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment

The Twenty-Fifth Amendment has four sections.86 The first codified
the Tyler Precedent by stating that upon “the removal of the President by
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become the President.”87 This
provision made it explicitly clear as a matter of law that a Vice President
who assumes the presidency because of the death or resignation of the President actually becomes the President rather than merely serving as an acting
President.
The second section allows the President to nominate a Vice President
whenever the vice presidency is vacant.88 This nominee becomes the new
Vice President upon confirmation by both the House and the Senate.89 This
is important for situations where the Vice President has been removed from
office or has died, or when the Vice President has ascended to the presidency.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

FEERICK, supra note 48, at 79.
Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 99–100.
See id. at 100–01.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 101–04; see also BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL
DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 305–33 (1968).
85. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 105.
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
87. Id. § 1.
88. Id. § 2.
89. Id.
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Section 3 allows for the President to transfer his power voluntarily to
the Vice President when he is unable to fulfill his duties.90 The President
must inform the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House in writing that he is unable to fulfill the duties of his office.91 The
Vice President then serves as acting President and has all the powers and
duties of the President of the United States until the President informs the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House that he is
able to resume his duties or until a new President is elected.92 This is similar
to the informal agreement between President Eisenhower and Vice President
Nixon, which was later adopted by President Kennedy and President Johnson.93
Section 4 allows for the involuntary removal of the President when he
is unable or unwilling to declare his inability.94 If the Vice President and a
majority of the cabinet, or such other body as Congress may by law provide,
vote that the President is unable to discharge his duties, and they convey this
in writing to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House, then the Vice President immediately assumes the powers of the presidency and serves as Acting President of the United States.95 The President,
however, can revoke this by informing the Senate Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House in writing that no inability exists.96 The
President then regains all of his powers and duties, and the Vice President is
no longer the acting President.97
If the President states that no inability exists, the cabinet and the Vice
President have two options. First, they can do nothing and allow the President to regain his powers.98 Second, if within four days a majority of the
cabinet, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, and the Vice
President vote again that the President is still incapacitated, and they inform
the President Pro Tempore and Speaker of the House that the President is
still incapacitated, then the President does not regain the powers of his office
and the Vice President continues to serve as Acting President of the United
States.99

90. Id. § 3.
91. Id.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
93. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 53; Stephen W. Stathis, Presidential Disability Agreements Prior to the 25th Amendment, 12 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 208, 209–12 (1982).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Applications and Implications of the Twenty Fifth-Amendment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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If this second option is used, Congress then must decide whether the
President is incapacitated.100 Once assembled, Congress must decide within
twenty-one days whether the President is incapacitated.101 If both chambers
determine by a two-thirds vote that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, then the Vice President continues to serve as
Acting President of the United States until the disability is removed or the
next President is elected.102 However, if Congress fails to act within the requisite time period, or fails to reach the two-thirds requirement, the President
resumes the powers and duties of his office.103 Nonetheless, there is nothing
forbidding the cabinet and the Vice President from implementing this process again.104
III. ANALYSIS
Although the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was a major improvement in
preventing presidential inability, it is uncertain whether the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment offers adequate protection against an incapacitated President
continuing to serve in his official capacity. Part A offers a historical critique
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment by concluding that if history serves as a
guide, the protections of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment are inadequate.105
Part B offers possible solutions to modify or replace the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment and their respective shortcomings.106 These solutions, broadly
speaking, include passing a new constitutional amendment to replace the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment or passing legislation within the existing constitutional framework. Finally, Part C examines methods of reform that can occur outside of the legal system.107
A.

The Historical Critique of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment

This nation has suffered serious difficulties with death, disability, and
incapacity in the White House.108 However, a few key historical trends have
occurred that bear special importance for the purposes of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. These trends are (1) that Presidents conceal their inabilities
from the public, (2) that Presidents conceal their inabilities from their ad100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part III A.
See infra Part III B.
See infra Part III C.
See generally EDWARD B. MACMAHON, M.D. & LEONARD CURRY, MEDICAL COVERUPS IN THE WHITE HOUSE (1987).
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ministration, (3) that Vice Presidents and the cabinet are ineffective during
periods of presidential inability, (4) that the press can be an ineffective
watchdog during periods of presidential incapacity, and (5) that Presidents
can be reluctant to transfer power under Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. These historical trends demonstrate that the protections of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment are insufficient.
1.

Presidents Conceal Their Inabilities from the Public

The first trend is that Presidents conceal their illnesses and disabilities
from the public. The first example of concealment occurred during the presidency of Grover Cleveland. President Cleveland, after being diagnosed
with cancer in May of 1893, concealed his diagnosis from the public.109
Making matters worse, Cleveland would undergo a secret surgery to remove
the cancer while on aboard a private yacht.110 The President was strapped in
a chair, given anesthesia, and the tumor was removed.111 This initial surgery
was extremely risky due to the conditions of the surgery and the President’s
poor health.112
The most egregious example is Woodrow Wilson’s inability following
his stroke.113 On October 2, 1919, Wilson suffered a massive stroke.114 He
was first discovered by his wife, Edith Wilson, who immediately called for
White House physician Dr. Grayson.115 Shortly thereafter, Dr. Dercum, a
neurologist, diagnosed Wilson as suffering from a stroke and paralysis on
the left side of his body.116
Shortly after the diagnosis, Dr. Grayson and Dr. Dercum discussed the
matter with Edith Wilson.117 Edith demanded that the doctors keep Wilson’s
medical condition confidential because she believed that sharing this information, which could result in his removal from office, would be detrimental
to his recovery.118 The doctors acquiesced to her request and would issue a
series of misleading statements to the press.119 The press largely took these

109. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 12–15; Leonard Schlup, The Case of Cleveland and Stevenson, 9 PRES. STUDIES Q. 303, 304–05 (1979).
110. BUMGARNER, supra note 20, at 138.
111. Id.
112. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 12.
113. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: A Cautionary Tale, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 585,
588 (1995); JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., WOODROW WILSON: A BIOGRAPHY 535 (2009).
114. Link, supra note 113, at 588.
115. MACMAHON, supra note 108, at 56.
116. JOHN C. RAND, CONSPIRACY IN THE WILSON WHITE HOUSE 67–68 (2015).
117. Id. at 68.
118. Id.
119. See id.
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statements at face value and ran encouraging articles about the President’s
improving health.120
Franklin Roosevelt also concealed his ailments from the public. President Roosevelt, in addition to downplaying his polio caused paralysis
throughout his entire political career, concealed his rapidly declining health
from the public during his final presidential election.121 After being elected
for a fourth term, Roosevelt’s condition continued to worsen; he was indecisive, lethargic, lost weight, and his blood pressure rose.122 However, Roosevelt, his doctors, and his advisors maintained to the public that he was in
good health.123
Kennedy also concealed multiple health issues from the public. At the
age of 30 years old, Kennedy was diagnosed with Addison’s disease: a disorder caused by an insufficient amount of hormones, which can be managed
by medication.124 Kennedy, who was a congressman at the time of his diagnosis, withheld this information from the public and blamed his symptoms
on malaria.125 Later on, Kennedy would have a secret and dangerous operation to relieve his chronic back pain while he was a senator.126 This surgery
was not known to the press or the general public until after his presidency
had ended.127 Despite protracted rumors of his Addison’s disease during his
presidential candidacy, Kennedy was able to put these rumors to rest by a
series of misleading, although factually accurate, medical statements.128
Despite overcoming the political consequences of his ailments, President Kennedy would never overcome their physical effects. During his presidency, Kennedy would take a variety of powerful medications such as steroids and cortisone for his Addison’s disease, antibiotics for urinary tract
infections, anti-spasmodics for his colitis, and an anti-psychotic for a temporary mood swing.129 Kennedy would also receive testosterone on a daily

120. See id. at 71–73.
121. MATTHEW B. WILLS, A DIMINISHED PRESIDENT: FDR IN 1944 35–50 (2003).
122. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 17–18.
123. Id. at 18.
124. Id. at 122; see also JOAN BLAIR AND CLAY BLAIR, JR., THE SEARCH FOR JFK 561–62
(1976); Addison’s Disease, MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.mayoclinic.org/
diseases-conditions/addisons-disease/home/ovc-20155636.
125. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 122.
126. Id. at 124–25; see also James A. Nicholas et al., Management of Adrenocortical
Insufficiency During Surgery, 71 AM. MED. ASS’N ARCHIVES OF SURGERY 737, 737–42
(1955).
127. MACMAHON, supra note 108, at 125.
128. Id. at 126–30; Fletcher Knebel, Kennedy Calls Gossip About Illness False, DES
MOINES REG., June 14, 1959, at 1.
129. Robert Dallek, The Medical Ordeals of JFK, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2002), https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/12/the-medical-ordeals-of-jfk/305572/.
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basis during his entire presidency.130 Kennedy was also given injections of
painkillers and amphetamines into his back.131 This information did not
come to light until years after his presidency had ended.132
Thus, this history shows us that Presidents often put their own political
interests ahead of being fully forthcoming with the public regarding their
declining health. Moreover, as evidenced by the less than candid release of
medical information by Hillary Clinton and Donald J. Trump during the
most recent election cycle, we can expect for this trend of deception to continue.133
2.

President’s Conceal Their Illnesses and Disabilities from Their
Administration

Second, in addition to concealing their health issues from the public,
many Presidents have concealed their health issues from their Vice President and cabinet. Once again, Wilson is the most extreme example: he kept
his Vice President and a majority of his cabinet in the dark about the true
extent of his disability.134
However, Secretary of State Robert Lansing and a few members of the
cabinet were informed confidentially about the full extent of Wilson’s disability.135 Because of his knowledge, Lansing suggested that the Vice President serve as acting President during this period of incapacity.136 On October
6, 1919, Secretary of State Lansing called a cabinet meeting and argued that
the Vice President should serve as acting President if Wilson was unable to
discharge his duties.137 However, White House physician Dr. Grayson refused to answer any questions and simply voiced Wilson’s supposed displeasure that a cabinet meeting had been called without his authority.138 This

130. Lee R. Mandel, Endocrine and Autoimmune Aspects of the Health History of John F.
Kennedy, 151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 350, 352 (2009).
131. ROBERT DALLEK, AN UNFINISHED LIFE: JOHN F. KENNEDY 1917-1963 398 (2003).
132. Id.
133. See Vikram David Amar, Can and Should States Mandate Tax Return Disclosure as
a Condition for Presidential Candidates to Appear on the Ballot?, JUSTIA (Dec. 30, 2016),
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/12/30/can-states-mandate-tax-return-disclosure-conditionpresidential-candidates-appear-ballot (discussing that state regulation of the ballots for federal election may be unconstitutional if they prescribe additional requirements for candidates
not found in the Constitution. Likewise, state requirements for presidential candidates to
disclose their complete health history or other requirements could be unconstitutional); see
also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
134. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 15.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 15–17.
138. Id.
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ended Lansing’s desire to have the cabinet label Wilson as incapacitated.139
Wilson would later dismiss Lansing as Secretary of State in February of
1920 due to his perceived disloyalty.140 As a result, for the next year and a
half, the United States would be without a fully functioning chief executive.141
Likewise, President Cleveland did not reveal his cancer diagnosis or
his plan to have a secret operation to his administration.142 Rather, only one
member of the cabinet was aware of this plan.143 Fortunately, Cleveland was
largely unaffected by the operation.144
Finally, President Franklin Roosevelt kept Vice President Harry Truman in the dark regarding his rapidly deteriorating health and did not involve him in any areas of foreign policy.145 Truman was not even briefed on
the development of atomic weapons.146 In fact, Truman had only spoken to
Roosevelt twice since the inauguration, and even then, only about legislative
matters.147 Despite the fact that Vice President Truman was not briefed on
matters of foreign affairs and national security, he was still able to provide
admirable leadership when he assumed the presidency.148 However, the fact
that a President in rapidly declining health kept his Vice President ignorant
of key matters of national security is a cause for concern and must serve as a
reminder for modern Presidents.
Due to the fact that Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is dependent upon aggressive action by the Vice President and the cabinet, it is
particularly distressing to see this long history of Presidents concealing their
failing health from their cabinet and their Vice President. Moreover, now
that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment empowers the Vice President and the
cabinet to remove the President involuntarily during periods of incapacity,
the incentive for Presidents to hide this damaging information has only in-

139. Id.; see also Edwin A. Weinstein, Woodrow Wilson’s Neurological Illness, 57 J. AM.
HIST. 324, 349 (1970).
140. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 16.
141. Michael Alison Chandler, A President’s Illness Kept Under Wraps, WASH. POST
(Feb. 3, 2007), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2007/02/03/a-presidentsillness-kept-under-wraps-span-classbankhead-woodrow-wilsons-deteriorating-healthdetailed-in-doctors-correspondencespan/1e558dea-4492-4808-af4391437470e8a3/?utm_term=.f76f43e19b1a.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See BUMGARNER, supra note 20, at 140.
145. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 19.
146. Id.; Barton J. Bernstein, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A
Reinterpretation, 90 POL. SCI. Q. 23, 34–39 (1975).
147. Bernstein, supra note 146, at 34–39.
148. Id.
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creased. Only time will tell if this American tradition of presidential deception will continue.
3.

Vice Presidents and the Cabinet Are Ineffective During Presidential Incapacity

Third, Vice Presidents and cabinet members are often paralyzed by indecision during periods of moderate to severe presidential inability, such as
when the President is alive but is unable to govern.149 The first example was
when President Garfield was incapacitated and Vice President Arthur refused to take any action to replace the mortally wounded leader.150 On July
2nd, 1881, at 9:20 a.m., President Garfield was shot by a disgruntled supporter.151 Garfield would largely be incapacitated for 80 days until his
death.152 As a result, foreign policy and the daily functioning of the executive branch essentially came to a halt.153 Garfield would not die until September 19, 1881.154 However, at no time during these 80 days of incapacity
did Vice President Chester A. Arthur confer with the President or attempt to
assume the duties of the presidency.155 Arthur was concerned about the appearances of seizing power, especially since they were from different factions of the Republican Party.156
Again, the most damning example occurred during the Wilson administration when Vice President Thomas Marshall refused to take steps to replace Wilson despite his protracted disability.157 Despite calls to serve as
acting President from Secretary Lansing, Vice President Marshall did not
seek to become the acting President because he was afraid of angering Edith
Wilson and appearing as a usurper of power.158 Likewise, with the exception
of Lansing, the cabinet was largely ineffective during this period in trying to
determine Wilson’s inability.159

149. Jerrold M. Post and Robert S. Robins, The Captive King and His Captive Court: The
Psychopolitical Dynamics of the Disabled Leader and His Inner Circle, 11 POL. PSYCHOL.
331, 348–49 (1990).
150. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 8-9.
151. JUSTUS D. DOENECKE, THE PRESIDENCIES OF JAMES A. GARFIELD & CHESTER A.
ARTHUR 53 (1981).
152. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 8; see also BUMGARNER, supra note 20, at 125–28.
153. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 9.
154. Id.
155. Id.; BUMGARNER, supra note 20, at 128.
156. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 8–9.
157. Id. at 15–17; Joel K. Goldstein, Review: He Almost Changed the World: The Life
and Times of Thomas Riley, 104 IND. MAG. HIST. 183, 184–85 (2008).
158. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 15–17.
159. See id.
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As such, due to Marshall’s timidity and Lansing’s dismissal, Edith
Wilson and Dr. Grayson essentially served as the de-facto President.160 They
controlled what matters, if any, reached Wilson’s desk, and they controlled
who would see the President.161 During this year-and-a-half period of disability, government vacancies went unfilled, twenty-eight bills became law
because of presidential inaction, and America’s entrance into the League of
Nations was defeated in the Senate.162 This unauthorized use of power and
executive weakness could have been prevented if Vice President Marshall
would have assumed his constitutional duty to manage the executive branch
during this period of presidential inability.
A surprising example of vice presidential timidity was Vice President
Richard Nixon’s deferential approach during Eisenhower’s recovery.163 On
September 24, 1955, President Dwight E. Eisenhower suffered a heart attack
while in Colorado.164 While he was recovering, the cabinet carried out the
status quo of government under an unofficial agreement.165 Additionally,
Governor Sherman Adams of Colorado, rather than Vice President Nixon,
served as the official spokesman of the President while he was resting in
Colorado.166
Not surprisingly, this system caused great confusion as it was often unclear to both the cabinet and the press whether Vice President Nixon, Governor Adams, or an incapacitated Eisenhower was in charge of the federal
government.167 To that end, Nixon was highly deferential during this period
and did not sit in the President’s chair or office.168 The cabinet also began to
act outside of their designated authority and soon began to realize the shortcomings of the current system for dealing with presidential disability.169
Nixon would eventually come to believe that this committee system only
worked due to the fact that there was not a national emergency or pressing
issue which occurred during Eisenhower’s period of incapacity.170 However,
160. Judith L. Weaver, Edith Bolling Wilson as First Lady: A Study in the Power of Personality, 1919-1920, 15 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 51, 51 (1985); Dr. Howard Markel, When a
Secret President Ran the Country, PBS (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
updates/woodrow-wilson-stroke/.
161. Weaver, supra note 160, at 51.
162. Id.; see also Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson’s Health and the Treaty Fight,
1919-1920, 9 INT’L HIST. REV. 73, 81 (1987).
163. Id. at 20–22; Robert E. Gilbert, The Impact of Presidential Illness on the Administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 31 POL. AND LIFE SCI., 16, 21 (2012).
164. FEERICK, supra note 45, at 213–14.
165. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 19.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 21.
168. Id. at 22.
169. Id. at 21.
170. See FEERICK, supra note 48, at 22.
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Nixon could have improved this situation by decisive executive leadership
rather than letting the cabinet run amok and letting a state governor serve as
the mouthpiece of the President of the United States.171 One should be concerned that if Vice President Nixon was afraid of being seen as a usurper of
executive power, the same could be true for other Vice Presidents.
Admittedly, the above examples occurred prior to the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. Thus, one might argue that a modern Vice President and cabinet, who are strengthened by the constitutional provisions of the TwentyFifth Amendment, would be much more decisive in the modern era. However, that is not necessarily the case.
For example, after President Ronald Reagan underwent anesthesia and
surgery following an assassination attempt, Vice President George H.W.
Bush was reluctant in exercising authority.172 At the time of the attempted
assassination, Vice President George H.W. Bush was in Texas, although he
immediately returned to the White House upon learning of the attack.173 Upon his return to Washington, Bush refused to take a Marine helicopter to the
South Lawn of the White House because “[o]nly the [P]resident lands on the
South Lawn.”174 Bush further noted that landing on the South Lawn “might
well have made for great TV, but I thought it would have sent the wrong
message to the country and to the world” and that “I was also thinking about
Nancy Reagan, and how she probably didn’t need that kind of distraction at
that time.”175
Once at the White House, Bush would continue his hands-off approach
to leadership.176 Bush would not use the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, either
Section 3 or 4, during Reagan’s surgery or while he recovered from surgery.177 Moreover, Bush did not assume any special powers or responsibilities during Reagan’s recovery from the surgery.178 Rather, Bush would defer
to or clear decisions with White House Chief of Staff James Baker, Counselor to the President Edwards Meese, and White House Deputy Chief of Staff
Michael Deaver. 179 In fact, these three individuals effectively managed the
171. See id.
172. Feerick, supra note 16, at 926.
173. Id.
174. Alan Peppard, Command and Control: Tested Under Fire, DALL. MORNING NEWS
(May 13, 2015), http://res.dallasnews.com/interactives/reagan-bush/.
175. Id.
176. HERBERT L. ABRAMS, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT: CONFUSION, DISABILITY, AND
THE 25TH AMENDMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF RONALD
REAGAN 188–89 (1992).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 188; see also The Presidential Troika, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 1981),
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/19/magazine/the-presidential-troika.html?pagewanted=all
(“[I]n the morning, they are on hand, as usual, for their start-of-the day gathering with the
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executive branch while the President recovered from his surgery for the next
several weeks.180 Although Bush desired to appear deferential, he ultimately
surrendered executive authority to unelected advisors who were not even
confirmed by the Senate.181
Likewise, the cabinet neglected its responsibility under Section 4 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment during Reagan’s period of incapacity. While
Bush was returning to the White House, Attorney General William Smith
and White House Counsel Fred Fielding brought the paperwork to invoke
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the situation room and explained the operation of the amendment to the President’s staff, advisors,
and the cabinet.182 Richard Darman, an assistant to the President, argued that
the subject matter was inappropriate and took away the documents and
locked them away in his safe.183 This ended any discussion of invoking the
involuntary protections of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, and the cabinet
would not further consider its constitutional obligation to invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.184 It is particularly distressing that the cabinet let an
assistant to the President sideline their constitutional obligation.
The reasons for this timidity in the executive branch are numerous. For
one, Vice Presidents are afraid of being seen as usurpers of power during
times of tragedy. Although a respectful gesture, this is not the strong leadership that the country needs during times of crisis. Rather, when in doubt, it
would be preferable for the Vice President to err on the side of decisiveness
during times of potential inability. If a power vacuum occurs in the executive branch, it is preferable that this vacuum is filled by the Vice President,
who was elected by the people of the United States and has a constitutional
responsibility to them, rather than having unelected cabinet members, presidential advisors, or even family members filling the leadership void.

President in his hospital room. ‘Boy, Mike, we sure screwed up the schedule,’ Mr. Reagan
jokes to Deaver. The swift-moving events at George Washington University Hospital were
merely the most dramatic example of the influence and authority of President Reagan’s troika
- Meese, Baker and Deaver. In the first months of the Reagan Administration, the headlines,
the limelight and the cover stories have focused on the President, Secretary of State Haig and
David Stockman, the Administration’s budget director. But behind the scenes, Meese, Baker
and Deaver have been the nerve center of the new Administration, orchestrating the Reagan
Presidency, guiding the new Cabinet and the entire Reagan entourage, screening all key appointments, subtly influencing politics and policies, helping the President set the tone in the
vital formative weeks of his stewardship and then enabling Vice President Bush to carry on
business as usual when the President was gunned down.”) (emphasis added).
180. ABRAMS, supra note 176, at 188–89.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 180.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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A related reason that Vice Presidents often justify their hands-off approach is out of respect for the first lady. This was evidenced during Wilson’s disability and by Vice President George H.W. Bush.185 From a matter
of public policy and constitutional law, this justification, or perhaps an excuse, has absolutely no merit.
Lastly, vice presidential candidates are often selected by a presidential
candidate for political reasons, such as the electability of the presidential
ticket or to unite various factions of their political party, rather than seeking
a true partner in managing the nation.186 As such, once the President is elected, Vice Presidents are often relegated to a quasi-ceremonial position who
have little actual power.187 Thus, Vice Presidents may often lack the political
strength within the executive branch, the experience, or the independent
authority to assert control persuasively during periods of incapacity. For this
reason, presidential candidates should pick a vice presidential candidate
with a demonstrated record of strong executive leadership or an individual
accustomed to making difficult choices under stressful situations rather than
a candidate who merely balances the ticket or unites the party.
Likewise, cabinet officials are often picked for political reasons rather
than for their independent strength. Moreover, as evidenced by Secretary of
State Lansing during the Wilson administration, cabinet members can be
dismissed by the President for any reason.188 The fear of being fired could
lead cabinet members to be especially timid during periods of presidential
inability.
4.

The Press Is an Ineffective Watchdog for Presidential Inability

Fourth, the press is often an ineffective watchdog for presidential inability. During President Cleveland’s secret surgery, for example, the press
was unable to persuasively determine what actually occurred until years
after the surgery.189 During Wilson’s inability, the press largely believed the
administration’s narrative that Wilson was not disabled.190 The press acquiesced in downplaying FDR’s physical limitations due to his polio caused
paralysis and did not discover his failing health during an election year.191
185. Peppard, supra note 174.
186. Katy J. Harriger, Who Should Decide? Constitutional and Political Issues Regarding
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 563, 576–578 (1995).
187. Id.
188. See FEERICK, supra note 48, at 15–17.
189. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 11–12.
190. Id. at 14–16.
191. HUGH GREGORY GALLAGHER, FDR’S SPLENDID DECEPTION: THE MOVING STORY OF
ROOSEVELT’S MASSIVE DISABILITY-AND THE INTENSE EFFORTS TO CONCEAL IT FROM THE
PUBLIC 93–105 (1999); Arthur Schlesinger Jr. et al., FDR’s Wheelchair, 29 WILSON Q. 7, 8
(2005).
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Finally, the press was unable to discover Kennedy’s Addison’s diagnosis,
his concoction of powerful medications, or his secret back surgery until well
after his death.192
However, it is worth noting that the press was aggressive in determining who was in control during President Reagan’s emergency operation.193
Further, in the modern age of cable news and the internet, one may believe
that situations like Wilson could not occur again. Likewise, due to the antagonistic relationship between the press and President Trump, it is unlikely
that any legitimate disability in the Trump administration could be hidden.194
Although these arguments have merit, we must remember that the press is
not infallible and that most journalists lack any sort of medical training.
Moreover, in contrast to President Trump, future administrations may have
very friendly relationships with the press. Thus, the possibility that the press
will serve as an ineffective watchdog for presidential inability remains to
this day.
5.

Presidents Can Be Reluctant to Transfer Power Under Section 3
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment

Finally, President Reagan was hesitant to invoke Section 3 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment on several occasions. While the President was
being taken to the hospital during his assassination attempt, Reagan did not
invoke Section 3 prior to taking anesthesia, which would have voluntarily
transferred power to Vice President George H.W. Bush until the President
recovered.195 Although this was an emergency situation, the President still
had the time and the mental capacity to invoke this section.196 His aides at
the hospital, under the belief that the President’s condition was stable, decided not to invoke Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.197
Additionally, on July 12, 1985, President Reagan had surgery to remove a polyp from his colon.198 Before anesthesia was used, President
Reagan signed a letter to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House transferring power to Vice President Bush, making
192. MACMAHON, supra note 108, at 125–27.
193. ABRAMS, supra note 176, at 109–111.
194. See generally RonNell Andersen Jones and Lisa Grow Sun, Making an Enemy of the
Press, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 29, 2017), https://illinoislawreview.org/
symposium/first-100-days/making-an-enemy-of-the-press/; see also David Jackson, Trump
Again Calls Media ‘Enemy of the People,’ USA TODAY (Feb. 24, 2017), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/24/donald-trump-cpac-media-enemy-of-thepeople/98347970/.
195. Id. at 179; U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
196. See ABRAMS, supra note 176, at 62.
197. Id. at 180–81.
198. Feerick, supra note 16, at 929.
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him the Acting President of the United States.199 However, the letter explicitly disclaimed using the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.200 Upon recovering
from the surgery, the President sent another letter to the Speaker and President Pro Tempore explaining that he had resumed the powers of his office.201
This episode is particularly perplexing considering that the President
complied with the formalities of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
while expressly denying the use of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.202 Since
the Amendment was not explicitly used, it is unclear whether Vice President
Bush had any legal authority as acting President.203 Reagan’s transfer of
power, as a matter of policy, was at least a step in the right direction and
marked an improvement to his prior surgery.
President George W. Bush did utilize Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment several times during surgery, making Vice President Dick
Cheney the Acting President of the United States.204 This is an encouraging
sign that Section 3 may be utilized more often in the future.
Based on these historical trends, the protections afforded in Section 3
and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment can be inadequate. Presidents often
conceal their medical issues and their inability from the public.205 They also
conceal these issues from the Vice President and the cabinet: the very individuals entrusted under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to implement the involuntary procedures of Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.206 Even
worse, when Vice Presidents and the cabinet have learned of presidential
incapacity, they often neglected their responsibility to temporarily replace
the President, even in the modern era under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.207 Additionally, the press is often unable to determine when presidential inability actually exists. Finally, Presidents may be reluctant to invoke
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
B.

Possible Modifications to the Law

Due to the current shortcomings of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
many commentators and academics have called for various proposals to
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 929–30.
204. See Feerick, supra note 16, at 931–32; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Cheney Pens Letter
While Acting as POTUS, N.Y. TIMES: CAUCUS (Jul. 30, 2007, 5:20 PM),
https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/cheney-pens-letter-while-acting-as-potus/.
205. See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 48, at 14–17.
206. Id.
207. ABRAMS, supra note 176, at 188–89.
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either repeal and replace the amendment or substantially alter the substance
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment under the existing legal framework.208
These proposals, broadly speaking, include constitutional amendments that
replace the Twenty-Fifth Amendment or legislation that modifies the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. However, as seen below, these proposals have their
own drawbacks or are unlikely to be implemented.
1.

Constitutional Amendments

The most direct way to cure the deficiencies of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment would be to repeal and replace the amendment.209 For the purposes of this analysis, it is helpful to consider a few alternatives to the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment that were not enacted into law. One alternative to
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was having the Supreme Court, with the assistance of medical experts, determine presidential disability.210 As stated
above, this method was favored by President Eisenhower.211 This process
would have begun when Congress, by a concurrent resolution approved by
two-thirds of each chamber, suggested that the President was unable to discharge the powers of his office.212 If this threshold were met, the Supreme
Court would then determine whether or not the President was able to discharge the powers of his office.213 If the Court held that the President was
unable to discharge his duties, the Vice President would become the acting
President until the next President was elected or until the Supreme Court
found that the President was able to discharge his duties.214
As compared to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, this proposal had the
advantage of not being dependent upon those close to the President being
responsible for initiating involuntary removal proceedings against their
208. See generally Robert E. Gilbert, Coping with Presidential Disability: The Proposal
for a Standing Medical Commission, 22 POL. AND LIFE SCI. 1 (2003); Marie D. Natoli, The
Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Opening a Pandora’s Box, 6 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 48, 48–50
(1976).
209. See Samuel H. Hofstadter and Jacob M. Dinnes, Presidential Inability: A Constitutional Amendment Is Needed Now, 50 A.B.A. J. 59, 62 (1964) (a request to enact the current
Twenty-Fifth Amendment because the existing legal protections were inadequate); John D.
Feerick, Presidential Inability: The Problem and a Solution 50 A.B.A. J. 321, 323–24 (1964);
see Thomas F. Schaller, Democracy at Rest: Strategic Ratification of the Twenty-First
Amendment, 28 PUBLIUS 81, 96–67 (1998) (discussing the replacement of the prohibition
amendment).
210. Presidential Inability: Hearing Before the Special Subcomm. on Study of Presidential Inability of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st sess. 1–2, at Sec. 3 (1957)
[hereinafter Presidential Inability].
211. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 23.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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leader. Additionally, the Supreme Court would presumably serve as a fairly
neutral and unbiased arbitrator of whether the President was able to discharge his duties. However, this proposal was ultimately rejected because of
a perceived lack of accountability and for violating the separation of powers
doctrine.215
In addition to concerns about lack of accountability and separation of
powers issues, this proposal is also weak in the sense that members of Congress and the Supreme Court do not have daily interactions with the President. As such, they may not know whether the President is beginning to lose
his ability to run the country. This is in stark contrast to the Vice President
and the cabinet who have daily interactions with the President.216 Additionally, because Congress has the ability to initiate this disability proceeding
under this proposal, there is the risk that this proposal could turn into a tool
of partisan politics rather than a sacrosanct responsibility. Finally, due to the
increased partisanship of the Supreme Court, it is debatable how impartial
the Supreme Court would be if it were required to make a finding of presidential disability.217 As such, this alternative should not be seen as a viable
alternative to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
A second alternative was the Presidential Inability Commission.218 The
commission would have been composed of the Vice President of the United
States, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the senior Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court, The Speaker of the House, the minority leader in the
House, the majority leader in the Senate, the minority leader in the Senate,
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General.219 The Vice President would not have voting privileges but would serve
as the leader of this commission.220
The commission would be convened if the President stated he was unable to discharge his duties or if three members of the commission believed
215. Harriger, supra note 186, at 575–76.
216. See generally Sarah Westwood, Trump Packs Schedule with Cabinet-Level Meetings, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-packsschedule-with-cabinet-level-meetings/article/2616558.
217. See Gregory Dickinson, One Justice, Two Justice, Red Justice, Blue Justice: Dissecting the Role of Political Ideology in Supreme Court Nominations, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 345,
356–58 (2017) (discussing the increased partisanship and ideological divisions on the Supreme Court); see also Lucas Rodriguez, The Troubling Partisanship of the Supreme Court,
STAN. POL. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://stanfordpolitics.com/the-troubling-partisanship-of-thesupreme-court-da9fd5a900ac#.janfersaq.
218. Presidential Inability: Hearings on S.J. Res. 28, S.J. Res 35, and S.J. Res. 84 Relating to the Problem of Presidential Inability Before the Subcomm. On Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 3–4 (1957) [hereinafter Presidential
Inability Hearings].
219. Id. at 43.
220. Id.
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that the President was unable to fulfill his duties.221 Once convened, the
commission would seek medical advice on the condition of the President.222
If a majority of the commission found that the President could not discharge
his duties, the Vice President would become acting President until the next
President was elected or until the commission found that the disability had
been removed.223
This proposal had the advantage of a broad group of elected leaders,
which would provide for some accountability to the people, justices who
should serve as detached observers of inability, and insiders of the executive
branch presumably loyal to the President.224 Moreover, because the Vice
President could not vote, any vote by the commission would hopefully have
the appearance of being a neutral finding of fact rather than a Machiavellian
takeover.225 Additionally, because of the specific requirement that the commission consult medical experts, any finding of fact by the commission
should be based, in part, on actual medical experts.226
However, some obvious drawbacks are that three members could easily
convene this commission.227 When two of the members will be a senator and
a congressman from the opposite party of the President, it is easy to imagine
that political mischief could occur. Furthermore, the most serious drawback
is that the President of the United States, who is the only elected official
representing the entire country and who receives millions of votes nationwide, could have his power taken away by five votes of a Presidential Inability Commission. Thus, this proposed amendment should not be used as a
model.
Finally, any proposed constitutional amendment, no matter the merits
of the proposal, would face significant procedural, political, and enthusiasm
barriers. On the procedural side, constitutional amendments are very difficult to enact because, absent a state convention, they require a two-thirds
vote in both chambers of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the
state legislatures.228 By implication, any amendment seeking to modify or
replace the Twenty-Fifth Amendment would face these procedural barriers.229 If reform were sought, Republicans would have a particular advantage

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 42–44.
Id.
Id. at 42.
See Presidential Inability Hearings, supra note 218.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
See id.
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because of their current strength at the state level and their majorities in both
chambers of Congress.230
Moreover, any amendment would face significant political barriers.
When reform was attempted in the past, both political parties were highly
suspicious of the motivations of the other party, such as when Democrats
rejected President Eisenhower’s proposals out of fear that this was a ploy to
make Nixon the President before an election.231 Thus, in this highly partisan
age, any constitutional amendment seeking to reform or replace the TwentyFifth Amendment would be viewed through the prism of presidential politics regardless of the merits of the proposal.232 Any reform offered by Democrats would essentially be dead on arrival due to their potential motive to
weaken President Trump and their current weakness at the state and federal
level.233 Republicans, however, would have an easier time passing reform
and lack an obvious political motivation for doing so.234
Finally, any amendment would face a significant enthusiasm gap. The
Twenty-Fifth Amendment was only passed after President Kennedy was
assassinated and the remaining line of succession was very vulnerable.235
Previous efforts at reform usually ended once a new President was elected
and public memory of the prior President’s disability faded.236 Although the
election of Donald J. Trump has revised some interest in the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, this interest is still lacking nationwide consensus to sustain
serious constitutional reforms. Likewise, due to the Democratic Party’s
weakness at the state level, and minority status in both chambers of Congress, any zeal by the Democratic Party is currently irrelevant barring an
unforeseen development.237 If reform is to be had, it almost certainly will not
take the form of a constitutional amendment and will require Republican
support.

230. See generally Sean Trende & David Byler, Republican Party the Strongest It’s Been
in 80 Years, REAL CLEAR POL. (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/
2016/11/17/republican_party_the_strongest_its_been_in_80_years.html.
231. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 24.
232. See, e.g., Adelle Nazarian, Democrats Invoke 25th Amendment, Question Trump’s
Mental Health, BREITBART (Feb. 20, 2017), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/
2017/02/20/democrats-question-president-trumps-mental-health/.
233. See Trende & Byler, supra note 230.
234. Id. However, this is assuming that they do not wish to see President Trump replaced
by Vice President Pence.
235. RONAN, supra note 13, at 71–72.
236. Id.
237. Trende & Byler, supra note 230.
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Other Body as Congress by Law May Provide

The Twenty-Fifth Amendment allows for the Vice President and “a
majority of either the principal offices of the executive departments or of
such other body as Congress may by law provide” to determine whether the
President is unable to discharge his duties.238 Congress’ power to create another body is vast: “it can designate itself, expand or restrict the membership
of the cabinet, combine the cabinet with other officials, and prescribe the
rules and procedures to be followed by that body.”239 Due to the hardships in
changing the Constitution, it is much more likely that any reform will be
done via congressional legislation pursuant to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
rather than a new constitutional amendment.240 Below are some of the other
bodies that Congress could create. This section will ultimately conclude that
an advisory panel of medical experts is the most efficient and responsible
way to improve the protections of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
a.

Panel of congressional leaders to decide inability

Congress could use its powers enumerated in the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to create a panel of congressional leaders, in conjunction with
the Vice President, to make the initial finding of presidential inability.241 On
the surface, this proposal has significant advantages. First, a panel of congressional leaders, who are elected by the people, would be independent of
the President’s authority. These congressional leaders would therefore display more independence than cabinet officials who can be fired by the President without cause. As an example, consider when President Wilson fired
Secretary of State Lansing for his perceived disloyalty by calling cabinet
meetings while the President was disabled.242 Additionally, because congressional leaders are elected by the American people and are responsible to
them, this panel would be more responsible to and representative of the people’s wishes. This is in stark contrast to a panel of federal judges or a panel
composed of medical experts deciding whether the President is disabled.
Congress could also impose a two-thirds requirement for the panel to make
238. U.S. CONST. amend XXV, § 4 (emphasis added).
239. Harriger, supra note 186, at 567 (quoting JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH
AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND EARLIEST APPLICATIONS 206 (1976)).
240. See Harriger, supra note 186, at 567.
241. U.S. Const. amend XXV, § 4; FEERICK, supra note 48, at 206 (noting that the legislative history of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment shows that “Congress’ power with respect to
the creation of ‘another body’ is vast. It can designate itself, expand or restrict the membership of the Cabinet, combine the Cabinet with other officials, require a unanimous vote of the
body established by law, and prescribe the rules and procedures to be followed by that
body.”); see also Harriger, supra note 186, at 566–67.
242. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 15–17.
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a finding of inability, which should prevent a slim majority of congressional
leaders from illicitly harming the President.
There is also precedent for Congress to serve as the judge of a President’s ability to serve. For example, the House of Representatives has the
power of bringing impeachment proceedings by a majority vote against the
President for treason, bribery, and other serious crimes and misdemeanors.243 The proceeding then moves to the Senate for trial.244 If the Senate
votes by a two-thirds margin to convict, the President can be removed from
office.245 Likewise, under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Congress serves as
the final arbitrator of deciding if the President is fit to serve when the President contests a finding that he is unable to discharge the powers of his office.246 Because Congress may have to ultimately decide whether or not the
President is disabled,247 having a panel of congressional leaders with the
power to initiate proceedings under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment seems
logical.
Despite this, Congress should not designate a panel of congressional
leaders to make the initial determination of presidential inability. First, a
member of Congress who is a member of the disability panel may use that
position to threaten the President or may use that position as leverage during
other negotiations. Second, there is a significant concern that during a divided government, when the President and the majorities of Congress are from
differing political parties, a hostile Congress could use the commission for
inappropriate reasons. This risk of politicized investigations during divided
government was highlighted by Douglas Kriner and Liam Schwartz who
found that:
Since the end of World War II, partisanship has played a key role (in
driving congressional investigations). Under divided government, highprofile oversight activity grows more frequent and intense. In unified
government, investigatory activity wanes, particularly when a cohesive
congressional majority is in place to defend its partisan ally in the White
House and the integrity of the shared party label.248

If Congress were given the power to initiate disability proceedings,
partisanship would play a key role as it has in the past for similar proceedings.249 This would be especially true given the current visceral anger con243. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
245. Id.
246. U.S. CONST. amend XXV, § 4.
247. Id.
248. Douglas Kriner & Liam Schwartz, Divided Government and Congressional Investigations, 33 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 295, 314 (2008).
249. See id.
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gressional Democrats have towards President Trump. Third, although Congress already has the impeachment power, they have not always used that
power responsibly.250 For example, during the impeachment of President
Bill Clinton, many academics and commentators believed that his impeachment was politically motivated rather than constitutionally justified.251 As
such, it is debatable whether we should entrust more quasi-judicial power to
the legislative branch. Finally, from a practical standpoint, a panel of congressional leaders would lack daily contact with the President and therefore
may not detect subtle changes in cognitive function or see isolated events of
incapacity. This is in contrast to the cabinet that often works with the President on a daily basis. Thus, a panel of congressional leaders should not be
entrusted to initiate disability proceedings against the President.
b.

Panel of federal judges to determine presidential inability

Similar to the idea originally proposed by President Eisenhower, Congress could create a panel of federal judges to determine presidential inability.252 This panel could be composed of various federal judges, from the district courts all the way to Supreme Court, selected at random for a set period
of time. To avoid the appearances of partisanship, the panel should be divided evenly between judges selected by Republican Presidents and Democratic Presidents. Congress should require that any finding of inability be supported by a two-thirds majority and should also provide for medical experts
to advise the panel. This panel could then schedule meetings with the President on a regular basis or when they suspect that the President is unable to
discharge the duties of his office.
A panel of federal judges, who serve for life terms, would have the advantage of being completely independent from the President. As such, they
would be much more independent than a panel of cabinet members who are
subordinate to the President and can be fired without cause. Also, unlike
congressional members, federal judges who are serving life terms should be
less interested in using the panel for short-term political purposes. Federal
judges, because of their job, would also be more qualified to listen to expert
testimony, hear all of the factual evidence, and make a detached decision
based on all the facts. Lastly, as compared to a panel of medical experts who
determine presidential inability, federal judges are at least confirmed by the
Senate, which provides for some oversight.
250. See Thomas R. Lee, The Clinton Impeachment and the Constitution: Introduction to
the Federalist Society Panel, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1079, 1093–96 (1999).
251. Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279,
314–15 (1998).
252. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 23.
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Although a panel of federal judges determining inability would certainly be preferable to a panel of congressional leaders, this option still should
not be used. First, although federal judges are selected by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, they still lack direct accountability to the American people at large. As such, because the people would have no direct recourse against a panel of rogue judges, this option is particularly troubling.
Second, although judges are certainly less political than congressional leaders, personal and political conflicts still arise between the executive and judicial branch, which is especially true during the current administration.253
Third, questions of presidential inability will almost always be mixed with
issues of national security and political questions: two areas where courts
are highly deferential.254 As such, a panel of federal judges would not be the
best reform.
c.

Panel of federal judges, congressional leaders, and cabinet
officials

As noted above, an early alternative to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
was to have a disability commission composed of Justices of the Supreme
Court, key congressional leaders, and cabinet officials to determine whether
presidential inability existed.255 Likewise, Congress could create an “other
body” similar to this early proposal.256 One advantage of this commission
would be the mixture of individuals serving on the commission: federal
judges, who should serve as detached observers; congressional leaders who
represent the people; and cabinet officials who are presumably loyal to the
President. Congress could impose a two-thirds majority requirement to prevent slim majorities or partisan interests from illicitly harming the President.
This balance of interests would be much more preferable to a panel
composed entirely of congressional leaders. As mentioned earlier, because
253. Jason Mazzone, President Trump and the Judiciary, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE
(Apr. 29, 2017), https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/president-trump-andthe-judiciary/; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Not Even Andrew Jackson Went as Far as Trump in
Attacking the Courts, ATLANTIC (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/02/a-historical-precedent-for-trumps-attack-on-judges/516144/.
254. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (noting that “terrorism or
other special circumstances” could warrant “heightened deference to the judgments of the
political branches”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S 137, 170 (1803) (“The province of the court
is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made
in this court.”); see also J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 97, 102 (1998).
255. Presidential Inability, supra note 209.
256. U.S. CONST. amend XXV, § 4.
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the judges and congressional leaders are independent of the President, they
would not fear reprisals from the President. At the same time, by having
cabinet officials serve on the committee, the President’s legitimate interests
would be protected as well. However, because congressional leaders would
be on the panel, politics would always be a factor.257 Likewise, due to the
implicit partisanship of the Supreme Court, it is possible that politics could
play a role as well even if Justices served on the commission.258 As such,
although this commission merits serious attention, it does not represent the
optimal method of reforming the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
d.

Panel of citizens to determine presidential inability

A previously unconsidered proposal in determining presidential inability would be for Congress to establish a panel of citizens, in conjunction
with the Vice President, to determine whether presidential inability exists.
This panel could be a representative cross-section of the nation. The panel
could also be sworn to secrecy, similar to a grand jury, so that any proceedings before it are confidential. If this panel receives information that the
President may be disabled, they could send a request to examine the President or invoke Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Likewise, the
Vice President could bring information before this panel to initiate Section 4
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Congress could also impose supermajority requirements so that any finding of disability would require a twothirds majority. Congress could also supply this panel with medical experts
of various backgrounds to help them in their determination of presidential
inability.
This novel way of determining presidential inability has some unique
merits. First, so long as the panel was representative of the nation at large, it
would represent the people of the United States and could be seen as a truly
democratic institution. This is in contrast to a panel of medical experts or
Supreme Court Justices determining presidential inability.259 Likewise, because this would be a group of citizens rather than officials from other
branches of the government, there would not be a separation of powers concern.260 Additionally, panels of citizens, like the grand jury, have historically
257. Kriner & Schwartz, supra note 248, at 313–14.
258. See Rodriguez, supra note 217; see also Kenneth W. Moffett et al., Strategic Behavior and Variation in the Supreme Court’s Caseload Over Time, 37 JUST. SYS. J. 20 (2016)
(arguing that Justices may be more hesitant to hear cases on certiorari if they are uncertain on
how their colleagues may rule.).
259. See SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES 233–34 (2016).
260. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (quoting United States v. Chanen,
549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 712 n. 54 (1973)
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been seen as a check against government misconduct.261 As such, this panel
could be seen as a check on government misconduct both from the standpoint of Presidents who conceal their disabilities and other government officials who would cover up those disabilities. Finally, juries are seen as valuable in deciding contested facts and legitimizing the outcomes of controversial subjects.262 Thus, a panel of citizens could likewise be seen as a valuable
way of determining presidential disability and offering legitimacy to that
controversial decision.
However, this proposal would have serious drawbacks. First, there
would always be the chance that a rogue panel of citizens is trying to investigate the President not because there is a serious allegation or evidence of
presidential inability, but because they dislike the President (this would be
especially true if the President was very unpopular).263 Second, although
grand juries have historically been seen as a check on prosecutorial misconduct, this is largely not true today.264 It is questionable how effective this
citizen panel would be in preventing government misconduct during presidential inability. Third, although a panel of citizens would have the benefit
of being representative of the people, they would not have a significant understanding of the workings of the executive branch. Unlike the cabinet,
they could not adequately weigh the political and policy consequences of
their action. Finally, and most importantly, a panel of citizens could fall
victim to a charismatic and Machiavellian Vice President who uses the panel
as a way to remove a President purely for his own political gain.265 The cab(noting that the grand jury is not part of the executive branch nor the judicial branch but “a
constitutional fixture in its own right.”))); see also Michael Daly Hawkins, The Federal
Grand Jury: Fish, Fowl, or Fair-Weather Game?, 33 OKLA. CITY. U. L. REV. 823, 828–29
(2008).
261. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668–67 (1972); Michael F. Buchwald, Of the
People, by the People, for the People: The Role of Special Grand Juries in Investigating
Wrongdoing by Public Officials, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 79, 96–100 (2007); Barry Jeffrey
Stern, Revealing Misconduct By Public Officials Through Grand Jury Reports, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 73, 74–76 (1986); see Rennee B. Lettow, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments,
103 YALE L.J. 1333, 1335–1340 (1995).
262. See Jason Mazzone, The Justice and the Jury, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 38–39 (2006).
263. See, e.g., Lydia Saad, Bush Presidency Closes With 34% Approval, 61% Disapproval, GALLUP.COM (Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/113770/bush-presidency-closes34-approval-61-disapproval.aspx.
264. Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 323 (1995).
265. Adam R.F. Gustafson, Presidential Inability and Subjective Meaning, 27 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 459, 467–70 (2009) (noting that Congressional review may serve as an inadequate remedy when the Vice President and the cabinet improperly label the President as disabled under Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment); see also Dr. Michael Cunningham,
House of Cards: Making Machiavelli Modern, LEWIS U. FAC. F. (Feb. 18, 2014),
http://www.lewisu.edu/experts/wordpress/index.php/house-of-cards-making-machiavellimodern/.
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inet, however, would presumably be more loyal to the President and more
cautious. Although a novel idea, a panel of citizens to determine presidential
inability should be rejected.
e.

Panel of former Presidents and Vice Presidents to determine
presidential disability

An interesting suggestion by Congressman Earl Blumenauer would be
for Congress to create an “other body” composed primarily of former Presidents and Vice Presidents to determine presidential disability.266 The congressman justifies his proposal with the understanding that this “group of
people understands the pressures of the office and what’s necessary to discharge the responsibilities (of the presidency). Further, they all won national
elections and were tested by actually discharging the responsibilities (of the
office).”267
Congressman Blumenauer’s proposal has some significant strengths.
First, former Presidents and Vice Presidents do understand the pressures of
the office and the requisite strength required to meet them. As such, a panel
of former Presidents and Vice Presidents would be the most qualified group
of individuals to judge whether a current President is fit to serve. Second,
the congressman is correct in saying that former Presidents, who were elected by the people, would have greater persuasive authority and more apparent legitimacy than a panel of unknown medical experts or relatively unknown political leaders. Third, because this panel would be composed of
former members of the executive branch, there is not a separation of powers
concern that arises when congressional leaders or judges determine whether
the President is incapacitated.
However, this proposal has the inherent weakness that former Presidents may have personal and political grudges against the current President.
For example, consider the living Presidents we currently have: Jimmy
Carter, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barrack
Obama.268 This group of individuals has significant conflicts with President
Trump. Former President Bill Clinton could be very biased against President
Trump because Trump just defeated his wife in a bitter presidential election.269 Likewise, former President Obama could be very biased considering
266. Blumenauer, supra note 5.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., David A. Graham, Here Are All 5 Living Presidents Together at the
George W. Bush Library, ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2013/04/here-are-all-5-living-presidents-together-at-the-george-w-bushlibrary/275296/.
269. Trump Wins Presidency, Defeats Clinton in Historic Election Upset, FOX NEWS
(Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/11/08/first-polls-close-in-2016-race-
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the personal animosity between him and the current President and the fact
that he was a strong supporter of the defeated Hillary Clinton.270 Additionally, both former President George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush could be
biased against Trump because Trump routed Jeb Bush in the Republican
Primary.271 This would essentially leave Jimmy Carter, a Democrat who is
92 years old, as the only former President without a direct personal conflict
with President Trump.272 Under Congressman Blumenauer’s proposal, however, these former Presidents with significant conflicts of interest would
help determine whether President Donald J. Trump is fit for office, or they
would have to recuse themselves. Additionally, although the most recent
election was especially contentious and filled with dynastic implications, we
should expect similar conflicts of interest to occur in the future. As such,
there are significant concerns about having a panel of former Vice Presidents and former Presidents deciding whether the current President is able to
discharge the powers of his office.
Despite the fact that political and personal disputes between the current
President and former Presidents could often arise under this proposal, it is
possible that these concerns could be manageable. For example, former
trump-projected-to-win-ind-ky-clinton-wins-vt.html; Ed O’Keefe, With Electoral College
Vote, Trump’s Win Is Official, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-electoral-college-is-poised-to-pick-trump-despitepush-to-dump-him/2016/12/19/75265c16-c58f-11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_story.html?utm_
term=.ed1a48fd333a; Jenna Johnson, At Florida Rally, Trump Resumes Attacking ‘Crooked
Hillary Clinton,’ WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2016/09/27/at-florida-rally-trump-resumes-attacking-crooked-hillaryclinton/?utm_term=.fd6008f25e25; Ian Hanchett, Trump: I’ll Have Special Prosecutor For
Clinton Email, ‘You’d Be in Jail,’ BREITBART (Oct. 9, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/
video/2016/10/09/trump-ill-have-special-prosecutor-for-clinton-email-youd-be-in-jail/.
270. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Jonathan Martin, Obama Endorses Hillary Clinton, and Urges Democrats to Unite, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/06/10/us/politics/obama-hillary-clinton-endorsement.html; Ben Kew, Watch: Obama,
Seth Meyers Taunt Donald Trump in 2011 over Possible Presidential Run, BREITBART (Nov.
9, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/big-hollywood/2016/11/09/watch-obama-seth-meyerstaunt-donald-trump-in-2011-over-possible-presidential-run/.
271. See, e.g., Dr. Susan Berry, Jeb Bush ‘Savaged’ by Donald Trump, BREITBART (Feb.
1, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2016/02/01/new-york-times-jeb-bushsavaged-by-donald-trump/; Reena Flores, Donald Trump, Jeb Bush Spar over Bush Family
Legacy, CBS (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/republican-debate-donaldtrump-jeb-bush-spar-over-bush-family-legacy/; Peter W. Stevenson, The Remarkably Personal Feud Between Donald Trump and Jeb Bush, in 1 Video, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/02/12/the-remarkably-personalfeud-between-donald-trump-and-jeb-bush-in-1-video/?utm_term=.c4525c210256; Matthew
Yglesias, “Low-Energy”: Donald Trump’s Favorite Diss on Jeb Bush, Explained, VOX (Sept.
4, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2015/9/4/9258037/low-energy-trump-bush.
272. See, e.g., Andrew Blake, Jimmy Carter Only Former President Confirmed to Attend
Trump Inauguration, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2016/dec/24/jimmy-carter-only-former-president-confirmed-atten/.
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Presidents often transcend traditional politics and serve as elder statesmen of
the nation rather than as advocates of their political party.273 As such, a panel
of former Presidents could very well put aside partisan considerations when
determining whether the current President is incapacitated. Likewise, former
Presidents who had personal disputes with each other often become amicable once their tenure is over. Recent examples include the friendship between George W. Bush and former First Lady Michelle Obama, the friendship between Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush, and the friendship between Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford.274 As such, it is entirely possible that a
panel of former chief executives would put aside any personal disputes and
fairly examine the situation.
All things considered, Congressman Blumenauer’s proposal has significant advantages and some potentially serious drawbacks. A panel of former
Presidents would have unique insight on whether a current President has the
ability to meet the demands of the office. However, there will always be a
concern about political and personal disputes between former and current
Presidents. Accordingly, although this proposal demands serious consideration, other solutions are preferable.
f.

Panel of medical experts to determine presidential disability

Another alternative to the current system would be for Congress to create a panel of medical experts from various backgrounds and specialties to
regularly meet with the President and determine with the Vice President,
rather than the cabinet, if the President is suffering from any incapacitating
conditions.275 An obvious advantage of this system is that these experts
would be more likely to diagnose or recognize debilitating conditions than
cabinet officials who usually lack specialized medical training.276 Moreover,
because this would be an independent body created by Congress, this group
of experts would be more aggressive than cabinet members who can be unilaterally fired by the President.277
273. See Kenneth T. Walsh, Bush and Ex-Presidents Counsel President-Elect Obama,
U.S. NEWS (Jan. 8, 2009), https://www.usnews.com/news/obama/articles/2009/01/08/bushand-ex-presidents-counsel-president-elect-obama.
274. Deena Zaru, George W. Bush Explains His Fondness for Michelle Obama, CNN
(Mar. 3, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/02/politics/george-bush-michelle-obamafriends/; Kevin Bahn, George H.W. Bush on Bonding with Bill Clinton, CNN (Mar. 5, 2013),
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/05/george-h-w-bush-on-bonding-with-billclinton/; Ford and Carter: An Odd Couple?, CBS (Feb. 18, 2000), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/ford-and-carter-an-odd-couple/.
275. See, e.g., Edwin M. Yoder Jr., Determining Presidential Health Under the TwentyFifth Amendment, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 607, 613–14 (1995).
276. See id.
277. Id.
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Nonetheless, there are major drawbacks to this alternative. First, a
commission of medical experts lacks accountability to the American people
at large, even if Congress appoints them. Moreover, the medical field is not
representative of the people of the United States in general.278 This is in contrast to the President who is the only elected official who represents the entire United States and receives millions of votes nationwide.279 Thus, it is
inappropriate for a small body of unelected, unrepresentative, and unaccountable experts to have the ability to sideline the President of the United
States, even if they have better qualifications and are more independent than
the cabinet.
Second, although a panel of medical experts would have more clinical
training in recognizing signs of inability, it is unclear how often they would
meet with the President.280 This is in contrast to the cabinet, which has frequent meetings and interactions with the President as a part of their daily
routine. Thus, the cabinet is in a better position to see subtle changes or isolated incidents of incapacity than a panel of experts who infrequently meet
with the President.
Finally, the decision on whether to invoke the involuntary protections
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is not a purely medical decision because
the decision cannot be separated from considerations of national security,
international diplomacy, and other issues of significance.281 Thus, the cabinet, with a large coalition of generalists from various areas of experience
and expertise, would be in a better position to weigh these concerns than a
panel of medical experts.282 As such, the idea of a panel of medical experts
determining presidential disability should be firmly rejected.
g.

Advisory panel of medical experts

A proposal by Dr. Bert E. Park is to have a panel of physicians, specializing in various areas of medicine, be selected by the President prior to

278. See, e.g., Margot Sanger-Katz, Your Surgeon Is Probably a Republican, Your Psychiatrist Probably a Democrat, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
10/07/upshot/your-surgeon-is-probably-a-republican-your-psychiatrist-probably-ademocrat.html?_r=0.
279. See Carl M. Cannon & Emily Goodlin, Trump to Disaffected Americans: “I Am
Your Voice,” REAL CLEAR POL. (July 22, 2016), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/
2016/07/22/trump_to_disaffected_americans_i_am_your_voice_131285.html.
280. Harriger, supra note 186, at 581–82.
281. Id. at 577–582; see also Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the TwentyFifth Amendment: The Power of Reciprocal Relationships, in MANAGING CRISIS:
PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 207 (Robert E. Gilbert ed.,
2000).
282. See id.
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the start of his administration.283 This panel, however, would be advisory
only and could not invoke Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.284
Rather, they would only give advice to the Vice President and the cabinet
pertaining to whether the President is able to discharge his duties based off
their examination of him.285
An advisory medical panel would have significant advantages over a
medical panel with the role of determining presidential inability. First, because they would lack the ability to actually remove the President, the concern of a small body of unelected doctors removing the President is eliminated. Second, because the cabinet would still be in charge of deciding
whether the President is disabled, they would still be able to weigh the other
policy ramifications of their decision as opposed to making a purely medical
decision.
This proposal would also be preferable to a panel composed purely of
congressional leaders.286 As noted earlier, a panel of congressional leaders
would be subject to unnecessary political factors during periods of divided
government. This would not be the case under an advisory panel of medical
experts because the cabinet, which is loyal to the President, would still be
responsible for making the preliminary finding of inability.
An advisory panel of medical experts, as a matter of practicality, is also
more likely to be implemented as compared to a panel composed of federal
judges, cabinet officials, and congressional leaders. This is because the latter
panel would represent a fundamental shift in the use of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, and therefore would face political, structural, and enthusiasm
issues. These same concerns would also apply to a panel composed of former Presidents and Vice Presidents. The advisory panel of medical experts,
by contrast, is simply tweaking the existing framework by giving the cabinet, which still decides whether inability exists, expert advice. This minor
change of the current system would be less controversial, and therefore has a
greater likelihood of success.
Finally, an advisory panel of medical experts would significantly improve the current system. First, with an advisory panel of experts, the cabinet and the Vice President would have expert analysis of medical and physiological issues when making any determination of presidential inability.
Second, because the panel is empowered by Congress, the panel would be
independent of the President and could encourage the cabinet to act when
necessary. As such, Congress should establish an advisory panel of medical
283. Bert. E. Park, Resuscitating the 25th Amendment: A Second Opinion Regarding
Presidential Disability, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 821, 821 (1995).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See supra Part III(B)(2)a.
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experts to assist the cabinet with their responsibilities under the TwentyFifth Amendment.
3.

Creation of a New Cabinet Position

Under the existing legal framework of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
the cabinet and the Vice President are entrusted to determine presidential
inability.287 There is no requirement for the cabinet to consult with outside
medical experts.288 However, Congress has the power to create new cabinet
positions.289 For example, after the attacks on the World Trade Center on
September 11th, 2001, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which
created the cabinet position of the Secretary of Homeland Security.290 Therefore, Congress, with the consent of the President, could create a new cabinet
position with the responsibility to detect presidential inability.291 This new
cabinet position could be a medical expert who could provide clinical advice
to his or her fellow cabinet members.
a.

Elevation of the White House physician to a cabinet level position

A popular proposal is to make the White House physician a cabinet office.292 Under this proposal, the President would select a physician to serve
as his personal physician.293 This selection, however, would then be subject
to congressional approval as it would be a cabinet level position.294 This
approval process would ensure that the physician is qualified and that the
physician is also aware of his or her dual role of detecting presidential inability.295 Moreover, if the Vice President and cabinet ever had to decide
whether or not the President was unable to discharge his duties, the cabinet
would have a medical expert who has personal knowledge of the President’s
health.

287. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
288. Id.
289. U S. CONST. art. II, § 2
290. Jonathan Thessin, Recent Development: Department of Homeland Security, 40
HARV. J. LEGIS. 513, 513 (2003).
291. See id.
292. See Aaron Seth Kesselheim, Privacy Versus the Public’s Right to Know: Presidential Health and the White House Physician, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 523, 543–44 (2002).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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Nonetheless, a glaring shortcoming with this proposal is physician ethics and confidentiality laws.296 Simply put, it would be difficult for a physician to be treating the President as a doctor and then be expected to use or
disclose that information in determination of whether the President is fit for
service.297 Likewise, because of this potential dual role, it is likely that Presidents would seek outside medical care so as not to alert the cabinet of a
potentially disqualifying medical diagnosis.298
Additionally, from a historical perspective, the White House physician
was often complicit in the cover up of presidential inability because of personal loyalty to the President.299 It is uncertain whether entrusting the White
House physician to implement Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is
realistic. As a related concern, the President can always fire his cabinet officials with or without cause. Accordingly, the White House physician, like
other members of the cabinet, may be hesitant to invoke Section 4 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment out of fear of being fired. Because of these considerations, it is not advisable to elevate the White House physician to a
cabinet level position. Rather, the White House physician and President
should retain a more traditional doctor-patient relationship.
b.

Creation of a new cabinet position to help determine presidential disability

A related approach would be for Congress to create a new cabinet position filled by someone with medical expertise with the responsibility to
monitor the President’s health.300 This position could offer medical expertise
to his or her fellow cabinet members if issues of inability arose and could
alert the cabinet or the Vice President if he or she suspected presidential
inability. Because this position would be created with the responsibility to
monitor the President’s health, this should prevent this cabinet member from
turning a blind eye to medical issues. Also, because this new position would
only be one vote among many cabinet members, there wouldn’t be the same
concerns about medical experts having disproportionate influence over the
executive branch.
296. See Confidentiality, Patient/Physician, AAFP (2013), http://www.aafp.org/
about/policies/all/patient-confidentiality.html; see also Lawrence C. Mohr, The White House
Physician: Role, Responsibilities and Issues, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 777, 789–90 (1995); Jerrold
M. Post, The Health of Presidents and Presidential Candidates: Dilemmas and Controversies, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 757, 757–59 (1995).
297. Arthur S. Link, Dr. Grayson’s Predicament, 138 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. PHIL.
SOC’Y 487, 494 (1994); see also Kirath Raj, The Presidents’ Mental Health, 31 AM. J.L. &
MED. 509, 518–21 (2005).
298. Kesselheim, supra note 292, at 543–44.
299. See, e.g., RAND, supra note 116, at 67–68.
300. See id. at 543.
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Nonetheless, an advisory panel of medical experts would still be preferable to a new cabinet position. First, as a matter of practicality, it would be
much easier for Congress to exercise its power under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to create an advisory panel of experts rather than create a new
cabinet post for a medical expert. Second, an advisory panel of medical experts could be composed of a broad group of physicians with various medical expertise and backgrounds. This would be preferable to appointing one
medical expert to a cabinet position who would have a more limited perspective overall. Finally, an advisory panel of medical experts created pursuant to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment could not be removed unilaterally by
the President. This is in stark contrast to a cabinet member who can be fired
without cause by the President. As such, an advisory panel of medical experts created under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is a much better solution
than creating a new cabinet position.
C.

Reform Outside of the Legal System

Prolonged periods of presidential inability can also be prevented without changing existing law. Broadly speaking, this would include making
presidential inability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment an explicit part of
presidential campaigns and senate confirmation hearings of prospective cabinet officials. Likewise, the executive branch could adopt voluntary agreements to supplement the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. These solutions are
discussed below.
1.

Greater Emphasis on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment during Presidential Campaigns

During the 2016 Presidential Campaign, the health of the major candidates was a frequent topic of discussion.301 Due to their advanced ages, the
press often discussed the health of Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton, and
Donald Trump.302 However, this discussion did not translate into more serious discussions about the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and presidential disability until Donald Trump was elected President. For example, despite Hilla301. See, e.g., Gregory Krieg, Clinton’s Health Is Fine, but What About Trump?, CNN
(Aug. 24, 2016), http:llwww.cnn.com/2016/08/23/politics/Donald-trump-hillary-clintonhealth/index.html; see also Jeff Zeleny, Sanders Releases Doctor’s Note, CNN (Jan. 29,
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/28/politics/bernie-sanders-medical-records/;
Jenna
Johnson, Trump Discusses Health on ‘Dr. Oz Show’ After His campaign Said He Wouldn’t,
WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/
2016/09/14/donald-trump-will-no-longer-discuss-his-medical-history-on-droz/?utm_term=.a2a6945b33d0.
302. See supra note 301.
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ry Clinton’s extensive medical history and advanced age, early criticisms of
her health and fitness for office were dismissed as sexist.303 This narrative
changed when she was diagnosed with pneumonia, a diagnosis that she initially concealed from the public, and then collapsed on camera, possibly
losing consciousness, on September 11, 2016.304 Clinton was then taken to
her daughter’s apartment and examined by her doctor at her home in Chappaqua, New York, rather than visiting a hospital.305 Such actions on behalf
of Clinton should have raised serious discussions on the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment and parallels to the Wilson administration. Likewise, although
questions about Trump’s health were raised during the campaign, serious
discussions about the ramifications and applications of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment were not raised until after he won the election, creating the
appearance of partisanship.306
For example, during all three presidential debates, the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment was never mentioned.307 Considering the health issues of both
candidates, and their advanced ages, a perfectly acceptable question would
have been to inquire about under what circumstances would a President
Clinton or a President Trump invoke Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. Another legitimate question would be what, if any, instructions
would a President Clinton or a President Trump give to their Vice President
303. Chris Cillizza, Can We Just Stop Talking About Hillary Clinton’s Health Now?,
WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/09/06/
the-questions-about-hillary-clintons-health-are-absurd/?utm_term=.cb8c239e4b91; Pam Key,
MSNBC’s Joan Walsh: Trump Questioning Hillary’s Health ‘Is the Classic Definition of
Sexism’, BREITBART (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/video/2016/08/29/msnbcsjoan-walsh-trump-questioning-hillarys-health-is-the-classic-definition-of-sexism/.
304. Chris Cillizza, Hillary Clinton’s Health Just Became a Real Issue in the Presidential
Campaign, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/09/11/hillary-clintons-health-just-became-a-real-issue-in-the-presidentialcampaign/?utm_term=.be8de9eaf35e; Alex Seitz-wald et al., Hillary Clinton’s Health Scare:
9 Unanswered Questions, NBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
2016-election/hillary-clinton-s-health-scare-9-unanswered-questions-n646551.
305. Alex Seitz-wald, supra note 304.
306. Compare Lawrence K. Altman, A Doctor’s Assessment of Whether Donald Trump’s
Health Is ‘Excellent,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/
19/us/politics/donald-trumphealth.html?module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Politics&action=keypress&region=Fix
edLeft&pgtype=article with Cathernie Caruso, Psychiatrists Debate Weighing in on Trump’s
Mental Health, SCI. AM. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
psychiatrists-debate-weighing-in-on-trumps-mental-health/.
307. Presidential Debate at Hofstra University in Hempstead, New York, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid
=118971; Presidential Debate at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct. 9, 2016), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=119038; Presidential Debate at the University of Nevada in Las Vegas, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=119039.
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and cabinet regarding when, if ever, they should invoke Section 4 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment against them.
Even more egregious, during the debate between vice presidential candidates Mike Pence and Tim Kaine, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was never mentioned.308 This would have been an exceptional opportunity to ask
both candidates about how they would deal with presidential incapacity,
when and under what circumstances would they consider invoking Section 4
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, and would they be ready to assume the
powers of Acting President of the United States if either Section 3 or Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment were invoked. Lastly, and most importantly, the vice presidential candidates should have been asked about
how they would handle the nightmare scenario where a majority of the cabinet and the Vice President believe the President is unable to discharge his or
her duties but the President contests their view.
In sum, although the health of both candidates was discussed during the
election cycle, there was not a serious discussion by the press with the candidates or their running mates about presidential disability and the TwentyFifth Amendment. The time for an objective inquiry into the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment should occur during the election when concessions can be
made from candidates and their running mates. The current calls to use or
alter the Twenty-Fifth Amendment after Donald Trump won the election are
largely partisan based rather than legitimately motivated by a desire for constitutional reform.309 This should serve as a lesson for future election cycles.
2.

Senate Confirmation Hearings

Likewise, Senate confirmation hearings of the prospective cabinet officials serve as an excellent way to probe nominees about their thoughts on
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. This is especially important because the most
308. Full Transcript: 2016 Vice Presidential Debate, POLITICO (Oct. 5, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/full-transcript-2016-vice-presidential-debate-229185.
309. See Michael Russnow, The 25th Amendment Could Rid America Of Trump, HUFF.
POST (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/25th-amendment-might-providesolution-to-rid-america_us_58ad0598e4b0d818c4f0a397; Ryan Grim, Nancy Pelosi Suggests
Donald Trump Get His Mental Health Checked: People Are Starting to Study up on the 25th
Amendment, HUFF. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nancy-pelosisuggests-donald-trump-get-his-mental-health-checked_us_5893aa48e4b0c1284f250e44;
Leah Barkoukis, Democratic Rep Floats Idea of Using 25th Amendment to Remove Trump
From Office, TOWNHALL (Feb. 21, 2017), https://townhall.com/tipsheet/leahbarkoukis/2017/
02/21/democratic-rep-floats-idea-of-using-25th-amendment-to-remove-trump-from-officen2288591; Alicia Powe, Democrats Discuss Using 25th Amendment to Remove ‘Unstable’
Trump from Office, WESTERN JOURNALISM (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.western
journalism.com/democrats-discuss-using-25th-amendment-to-remove-unstable-trump-fromoffice/.
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important decision a cabinet member may ever make could be a decision to
invoke Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Cabinet nominees should
be asked how they would respond to a situation where the President was
displaying serious signs of inability, under what situations would they consider invoking Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, and how they
would respond if a President, after being found unable to discharge his duty
by the Vice President and a majority of the cabinet, contested their decision
and tried to reclaim the powers of his office. Additionally, cabinet positions
with special legal obligations, such as the Attorney General, or candidates
with medical expertise should be asked additional questions regarding their
unique responsibility regarding the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
Nonetheless, during the confirmation hearing of Dr. Ben Carson, the
issue of presidential disability or the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was never
mentioned.310 This is especially dismaying because Dr. Carson is a neurologist and a medical doctor and, due to this background, would be invaluable
if Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment were ever invoked, or needed
to be invoked. Likewise, Jeff Sessions was never asked about the TwentyFifth Amendment despite the fact that, as Attorney General of the United
States, he would have a unique responsibility in advising the President, the
Vice President, the cabinet, and the rest of the administration about Section
3 and Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.311 This trend of not discussing presidential disability or the Twenty-Fifth Amendment continued
for the rest of President Trump’s cabinet nominees.312
310. Housing and Urban Development Secretary Confirmation Hearing, C-SPAN (Jan. 12,
2017) https://www.c-span.org/video/?421258-1/hud-secretary-nominee-ben-carson-testifiesconfirmation-hearing.
311. Attorney General Confirmation Hearing, Day 1 Part 1, C-SPAN (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?420932-1/attorney-general-nominee-jeff-sessions-testifiesconfirmation-hearing; Attorney General Confirmation Hearing, Day 1 Part 2, C-SPAN (Jan.
10, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?420932-101/attorney-general-nominee-jeff-sessi
ons-testifies-confirmation-hearing.
312. Education Secretary Confirmation Hearing, C-SPAN (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.cspan.org/video/?421224-1/education-secretary-nominee-betsy-devos-testifies-confirmationhearing; Secretary of State Confirmation Hearing, Part 1, C-SPAN (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?421335-1/secretary-state-nominee-rex-tillerson-testifiesconfirmation-hearing; Secretary of State Confirmation Hearing, Part 2, C-SPAN (Jan. 11,
2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?421335-3/secretary-state-confirmation-hearing-part-2;
Treasury Secretary Confirmation Hearing, C-SPAN (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.cspan.org/video/?421858-1/treasury-secretary-nominee-steven-mnuchin-testifiesconfirmation-hearing; Defense Secretary Confirmation Hearing, C-SPAN (Jan 12, 2017),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?421347-1/defense-secretary-nominee-general-james-mattissays-russia-trying-break-nato; Homeland Security Secretary Confirmation Hearing, C-SPAN
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?421234-1/homeland-security-nomineegeneral-john-kelly-testifies-confirmation-hearing; Energy Secretary Confirmation Hearing,
C-SPAN (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?421782-1/energy-secretary-nomineerick-perry-testifies-confirmation-hearing; Veterans Affairs Secretary Confirmation Hearings,
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As a practical concern, it may be difficult to get substantive answers
from cabinet nominees about how they would handle presidential inability.
For example, judicial nominees often demur on legal questions in Senate
confirmation hearings because they believe that answering those questions
will undercut their appearance of impartiality. Likewise, cabinet nominees
may offer similar justifications for not answering how they would handle
presidential inability. Despite this concern, the act of bringing up presidential inability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment during Senate confirmation
hearings would still impress upon cabinet nominees their constitutional responsibilities and remind them of their duty under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. Senators should openly question cabinet nominees about their
views of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and presidential inability during
confirmation hearings.
3.

Establishment of Guidelines and Agreements in the Executive
Branch

Lastly, Presidents and their administrations should create guidelines
and agreements to supplement the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.313 The President should discuss situations where he would wish to invoke Section 3 of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, such as when he would undergo anesthesia,
and those agreements should be prepared in advance so that they could be
signed at a moment’s notice during stressful situations.314 This would be
especially important in a situation where the President had been shot and
C-SPAN (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?422806-1/veterans-affairs-secretarynominee-david-shulkin-testifies-confirmation-hearing; Transportation Secretary Confirmation Hearing, C-SPAN (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?4212301/transportation-secretary-nominee-elaine-chao-testifies-confirmation-hearing; Health and
Human Services Secretary Confirmation Hearing, C-SPAN (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.cspan.org/video/?421723-1/hhs-nominee-representative-tom-price-testifies-capitol-hill; Commerce Secretary Confirmation Hearing, C-SPAN (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.cspan.org/video/?421257-1/commerce-secretary-nominee-wilbur-ross-testifies-confirmationhearing; Interior Secretary Confirmation Hearing, Part 1, C-SPAN (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?421718-1/ryan-zinke-says-will-address-sexual-assaultallegations-interior; Interior Secretary Confirmation Hearing, Part 2, C-SPAN (Jan. 17,
2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?421718-2/interior-secretary-confirmation-hearing-part2.
313. See, e.g., Calvin Bellamy, Presidential Disability: The Twenty-Fifth Amendment Still
an Untried Tool, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 373, 404 (2000); see also Kesselheim, supra note 292,
at 544–45; see Herbert L. Abrams, The Vulnerable President and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, with Observations on Guidelines, a Health Commission, and the Role of the President’s Physician, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 453, 473–78 (1995); Nancy Kassop, “The Law”
when Law and Politics Collide: Presidents and the Use of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 35
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q., 147, 163 (2005).
314. See Herbert L. Abrams, Shielding the President from the Constitution: Disability
and the 25th Amendment, 23 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 533, 533–36 (1993).
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was quickly being transported to the hospital. Such a prepackaged agreement could then be quickly signed by the President before he undergoes
anesthesia or otherwise becomes incapacitated.
Likewise, at the start of his administration, a President should discuss
potential situations where he would wish that Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment be invoked against him.315 These situations could include typical situations, such as losing consciousness for a prolonged period of time or
being diagnosed with a severe mental disease; to more complicated situations such as if the President has fallen into the hands of the enemy. Likewise, Presidents should decide on key terms, definitions, and the general
intent of these instructions.
These contingency plans should then be signed by the President, the
Vice President, the cabinet, and witnessed by detached observers. These
instructions should then be made available for public viewing if the TwentyFifth Amendment were ever utilized. Although these agreements would not
have the force of law, they would provide highly persuasive authority of
what the cabinet and Vice President should do during periods of incapacity.
Moreover, such voluntary agreements have yielded success in the past.
These agreements would hopefully provide enough encouragement to avoid
disasters like those in the past where the cabinet or the Vice President was
complacent.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment can be improved within the existing legal framework with relatively minimal effort. These reforms include (1) the
adoption of voluntary agreements within the executive branch to give meaning to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, (2) the creation of an advisory panel of
medical experts to advise the Vice President and the cabinet on whether
presidential disability exists, and (3) greater emphasis on presidential incapacity throughout the political process.
A.

Voluntary Agreements within the Executive Branch

The Trump administration, as well as future administrations, should
adopt various voluntary agreements to give meaning and context to the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. President Trump and his advisors should consider specific situations where the President would want to transfer power voluntarily, such as when undergoing surgery, and have those agreements made

315. See Birch Bayh, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Dealing With Presidential Disability, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 437, 449-450 (1995).
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pursuant to the language of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.316
These agreements should then be kept close to the President at all times so
they can be signed at a moment’s notice in the event of an emergency.
More importantly, President Trump and future Presidents should decide under what situations they would want Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment invoked against them.317 These situations could include a broad
range of situations such as the President being diagnosed with a degenerative mental illness or the President falling into the hands of the enemy.318
The President, in conjunction with his physician and attorneys, should also
consider drafting and defining key terms and the general intent of these instructions.319 Such voluntary instructions, although they would not have the
force of law, could help prevent prolonged periods of incapacity.
B.

An Advisory Panel of Medical Experts

Pursuant to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and existing law, Congress
should establish an advisory panel of medical experts. This panel should be
advisory only and should not be able to invoke Section 4 of the TwentyFifth Amendment.320 Rather, this panel should only be able to advise the
Vice President and the cabinet on whether the President is incapacitated and
give other medical advice.
This middle ground approach at reform is optimal because it does not
place undue importance on medical experts, which would occur if Congress
created a special commission of medical experts to decide whether presidential inability existed. This advisory panel also does not represent a significant separation of powers concern, which would occur if Congress created a
panel composed of federal judges and congressional leaders, and the advisory panel has the advantage of being independent from the President. Finally,
from a practicality standpoint, this reform is much more likely to gain the
requisite support to be enacted into law as compared to other proposed reforms.

316. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
317. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
318. See Daniel J.T. Schuker, Burden of Decision: Judging Presidential Disability Under
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 30 J.L. & POL. 97, 117–40 (2014).
319. See Bert E. Park, M.D., Protecting the National Interest: A Strategy for Assessing
Presidential Impairment Within the Context of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 593, 593–96 (1995).
320. See Bert. E. Park, supra note 283, at 821–26.
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Greater Political Scrutiny

Finally, more emphasis needs to be placed on presidential inability and
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment throughout the political process. First, the
press must always be alert to who is in control of the executive branch and
whether the President is suffering from any legitimate, debilitating conditions. Second, during the election season, journalists need to question presidential candidates about when they would consider invoking Section 3 of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and when they would wish that Section 4 of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment be invoked against them. Likewise, the press
should ask vice presidential candidates under what situations they would
invoke Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and how they would respond to a President who contested their finding that an inability existed.
Finally, during senate confirmation hearings of cabinet nominees, the Senate
must impress upon cabinet nominees of their duties under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment and ask them under what situations the nominee would consider invoking Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
History shows that Vice Presidents and cabinet officials often lack the
will or the ability to effectively check a President who has become incapacitated. Additionally, Presidents have historically held onto power despite the
fact that they were incapacitated, in rapidly declining health, or disabled.
This causes great concern because the current framework of the TwentyFifth Amendment is premised on the ability of the Vice President and members of the cabinet to remove an incapacitated President under Section 4 of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment or for the President to voluntarily transfer his
power under Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Vice President before he becomes incapacitated.
However, despite the shortcomings of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, it
still represents the most effective way to manage presidential disability because the cabinet and the Vice President are in the best position to observe
the President, these individuals know the responsibilities of the executive
branch, and these individuals, collectively, are not predisposed to use the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment for improper reasons.
Likewise, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment still allows for the possibility
of reform. This reform should include (1) establishing an advisory panel of
medical experts to assist the cabinet in determining whether the President is
incapacitated and (2) establishing voluntary agreements within the executive
branch to give meaning and context to the protections of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. Furthermore, having legitimate discussions about presidential
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inability throughout the political process will strengthen the protections of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
Taken together, these reforms within the existing constitutional framework will help prevent presidential disability, which is of paramount importance in the modern era. Further, these improvements are realistically
achievable in the current political environment. Therefore, congressional
leaders and the Trump administration should evaluate and adopt these proposed reforms.

